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ary causes, making use of both Aristotelian 
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metaphysical mechanism by which God 
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present his arguments as they appear in 
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Resumen. El objetivo principal del presen-
te trabajo será comparar cómo Tomás de 
Aquino expresó su doctrina de la providen-
cia a través de las causas segundas, utilizan-
do principios metafísicos tanto aristotélicos 
como neo-platónicos, en el séptimo artículo 
de la tercera cuestión de sus Quaestiones Dis-
putatae De Potentia Dei y su Super Librum de 
Causis Expositio, en los que busca resolver 
el problema del mecanismo metafísico por 
el que Dios guía la creación providencial-
mente. Presentaré primero sus argumentos 
como aparecen en las cuestiones disputa-
das, seguido por una presentación de su 
pensamiento en el comentario al Liber de 
Causis, para concluir con un análisis compa-
rativo de la solución al problema de la acti-
vidad providente de Dios en la naturaleza.
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1. Introduction
The main goal of this paper is to compare how Thomas Aquinas ex-
pressed his doctrine of providence through secondary causes, making use 
of both Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic principles, in the seventh article of 
the third question of his Quaestiones Disputatae De Potentia Dei and his Super 
Librum de Causis Expositio, in which he intends to solve the problem of the 
metaphysical mechanism by which God providentially guides creation. I 
will first present his arguments as they appear in the disputed questions, 
followed by a presentation of his thought on the matter in his commentary 
of the Liber de Causis, and concluding with my comparative analysis of 
Aquinas’ solution to the issue of God’s providential activity in nature.
Aquinas devoted much of his work to the theme of divine providence, 
and to explaining how God guides the created universe by acting through 
secondary created causes. This topic was crucial for thirteenth century Eu-
ropean university scholars, and so it was for Aquinas. This importance was 
given via the rejection or acceptance of certain versions of divine action 
in nature that denied nature’s works, which arrived to Europe through 
the treatises of Arabic and Jewish commentators from previous centuries, 
such as Al-Ghazali and the Kalam school, or the Jewish philosopher Ibn-
Gabirol (known to Aquinas as Avicebron). These thinkers held that the 
only true cause in nature was God, given that creatures did not possess 
real causal powers.
Aquinas came to know this problem through the works of Maimonides 
and the Latin translations of Averroes’ Commentaries on Aristotle, and one 
can find references to it throughout his works, starting from the Commen-
tary on the Sentences (In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 4) to the Summa Contra Gentiles 
(III, 65 and 69), Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate (q. 5, a. 2, ad 6), De Poten-
tia Dei (q. 3, a. 7), and the Summa Theologiae (I, q. 105, a. 5). Aquinas always 
discusses the way in which divine providence works in nature through a 
presentation of the relations between primary and secondary causes. Per-
haps the most important treatises to study his thought on these relations 
between primary and secondary causes are the Quaestiones Disputatae De 
Potentia Dei, disputed between 1265 and 1266 in Rome (just before starting 
his Summa Theologiae), and the Super Librum de Causis Expositio, probably 
written during the first half of 1272 in Paris, having already started writing 
the Summa.
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The core of Aquinas’ teaching on providence, a preliminary definition 
of which is ordinare in finem (SCG III, 73)1, is that providence reaches the 
whole of the natural world, closely following his own doctrine of creatio 
ex nihilo, by which Aquinas explains the complete dependence in being 
and acting of those beings that are not the Creator. In explaining this doc-
trine, however, Thomas goes a step further and affirms that when creat-
ing, God does not do it only universaliter, but rather puts each being into 
existence particularly and individually: effectus autem Dei sunt res singu-
lares. Hoc enim modo Deus causat res, inquantum facit eas esse in actu (SCG I, 
65). God’s causality extends not only to the general ways in which nature 
works2, but also to the singular beings in particular. Aquinas concludes, 
thus, that God’s providence shares the same features, not only guiding the 
totality of the universe as such, but also ruling each singular event in its 
own individuality: necesse est dicere omnia divinae providentiae subiacere, non 
in universali tantum, sed etiam in singulari (S.Th. I, q. 22, a. 2, co)3. Thus, God 
providentially directs everything that is created4.
The question, however, remains: how does God act providentially for 
every singular being, given that it is neither evident nor apparent that this 
is so? In his treatment in the QD De Potentia Dei q. 3, a. 7, Aquinas affirms 
that God, as primary cause of every being’s existence, is also the cause of 
the causal power of that being and of the action of that being. In what will 
come to be the Neo-Platonic turn of his argument, Aquinas also affirms 
that God, as primary cause, has more influence in the effect of the second-
ary cause than the secondary cause itself.
1  See also S.Th. I, q. 22, a. 1, co.: Ipsa igitur ratio ordinis rerum in finem, providentia in Deo 
nominatur.
2  Here Aquinas is thinking on the natural species. He argues that God is not only the 
cause of the species as such, but also of the particular being of that species. In fact, God 
causes the existence of the species because He causes the particular to exist. Were there 
no individual of a particular species, God would no longer be causing the species to 
exist. I paraphrase him saying ‘how nature works’ because the nature of a being is that 
from which the ways that being’s actions proceed.
3  He repeats this idea in De Pot. q. 6., a. 6, co: Deus non solum universalem providentiam de 
rebus corporalibus habeat, sed etiam ad res singulas eius providentia se extendat.
4  In S.Th. I, q. 22, a. 2. co, Aquinas uses the notion of participation to say this same 
thing: necesse est omnia, inquantum participant esse, intantum subdi divinae providentiae.
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2. Divine Providential Action in QD De Potentia Dei 3, 7
The QD De Potentia Dei, disputed during 1266, are divided in three 
large sections. In the first place, Aquinas discusses God’s power absolute-
ly (q. 1), where he questions whether God has power at all, whether his 
power is infinite, whether there is anything impossible for God; and about 
God’s generative power (q. 2), where he asks whether God can generate 
ad intra of the divine nature (the Son), and ad extra of the divine nature 
(creation). In the second section Aquinas focuses on how God generates 
created things questioning first the notion of creation (qq. 3-4), where, 
among other things, he asks about God’s action in nature; the preservation 
of creation in existence (q. 5), and miracles (q. 6). In the final section Aqui-
nas returns to the divine essence, asking about divine simplicity (q. 7), the 
divine names (q. 8), and the divine persons (qq. 9-10).
The third question, in particular, is about creation, and it is divided 
into nineteen articles, being the longest in these disputed questions. The 
seventh article of this question is devoted to the problem of whether God 
is active in the actions of nature in any sense, and it is the first article that 
changes the topic from creation itself, a theme that Aquinas deals with in 
the first six articles of this third question.
The corpus of the seventh article is divided into two large sections. In 
the first one Aquinas engages with two opinions that deny the activity of 
nature, first that of Al-Gazhali and the Kalam theologians, and later that of 
Avicebron, explaining their errors. In the second section Aquinas explains 
how he conceives God is active in the actions of nature. I will present the 
former in two separate subsections, and the latter in a third subsection.
a. On Kalam Theologians
After having considered the notion of creatio ex nihilo in the first six 
articles of this question, Aquinas asks whether God acts in nature’s opera-
tions. As mentioned earlier, Aquinas approaches this question rejecting 
first the views of those who say that nature does not have any proper 
operation and that it is only God who acts in every natural action, giving 
two examples, the Arabic school of Kalam theologians (though not men-
tioning them), and the Jewish philosopher Avicebron (Solomon Ibn Gabi-
rol). I will devote this section to explaining Aquinas’ arguments against 
Kalam theology.
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In the twelfth century, Al-Gazhali, in his famous book The Incoher-
ence of the Philosophers, tried to show that philosophers who adopted Greek 
views were unsuccessful in achieving a coherent theory of divine action. 
Before him, from the eighth to the twelfth centuries5, there was a strong 
defence of the Islamic religious ideas held by the Mutakallimun theologians 
(of which Al-Gazhali was the greatest proponent), within which the Kalam 
theology was the main stream of thought6. Their basic idea was that the 
unchangeable nature of God’s omnipotence and providence made it nec-
essary to admit that there is no active power in nature, but that it is God 
who acts in every apparently natural event.
According to Islam the universe is created out of nothing and it had 
a beginning in time. Kalam theologians considered that God re-creates the 
universe at every instant, hence regarding creation as an atomic event, by 
which God puts the universe into existence at every single moment of time, 
and allowing it to be rational and intelligible by keeping the regularities of 
nature. Kalam theologians assumed that the properties of an existent being 
in the natural universe changed constantly, in a continual process of re-
creation, as if in every moment the universe is in the process of becoming. 
In fact, for Kalam theologians, the universe is restless and is continuously 
developing; nothing in the universe would stay two moments in a station-
ary state. Together with this idea, following their atomistic perspective on 
nature, Kalam theologians believed that ‘no being, in and of itself, by vir-
tue of the inherent principles of its being, is oriented towards a becoming 
other than its; and that ‘all things are no more than they are and their being 
is complete and fulfilled at any given moment of their existence’. Hence, 
‘no being has in itself any intrinsic “potentiality” to change or alteration’; 
and it becoming other is entirely dependent upon and resides in the poten-
tiality of an exterior agent who is capable of effecting the change’ (Frank, 
2007b, p. 20).
In addition to these notions, Kalam theologians considered that the effi-
cient cause whose effect is the real material existence of the thing must be 
5  For a brief sketch of the development of kalam theology see (Frank, 2007a) and (Alusi, 
1965).
6  See (Altaie, 2008, p. 83). My goal in this brief exposition of the Kalam theology is nei-
ther to expound it in its complex diversity and nuances, nor to enter the copious debate 
around it, but to create an idea of the environment with which Thomas was dealing at 
his time. For a much longer and deeper analysis see (Frank, 2007b) and (Alusi, 1965) 
especially part II.
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the cause of the totality of its being, in terms of being something existent 
and having the reality that it has. Hence, the act of causality at the moment 
of the realisation of the act is itself grounded in God’s creative causality: the 
single act that produces the existence of the thing, is the cause of the totality 
of its reality (Frank, 2007a, p. 328). This, plus the atomistic and constantly 
evolving universe framework, revealed to Kalam theologians that all change 
involves a creation, since whatever change is affected represents the realisa-
tion of a new being entirely (Frank, 2007b, p. 22). ‘They proposed this [the 
theory of constant re-creation] in order to preserve the involvement of God 
in the world and to perform his essential role, which they saw as necessary 
(but not always sufficient) to sustain the existence of the world’ (Altaie, 2008, 
p. 87). Hence, in order to accept (we can say from religious premises7) the 
constant involvement of God in the universe, they needed to diminish the 
activities of nature to the point of denying them. From these statements, 
they admitted that there was no deterministic causality in nature; in fact, 
there was no causality at all in nature, which left a completely indeterminate 
world, though ordered by the will of God.
Divine sovereignty over worldly events was clearly at stake. Were na-
ture to act by itself, there would be no place at all for God to act. Neverthe-
less, given the theological premises that stated that God is omnipotent and 
that He governs and guides the universe by acting within it, it was neces-
sary for them to admit that nature had no powers to act at all. This idea led 
them to the conclusions about the atomistic and constant re-creation of the 
universe as the way in which God continuously acted within it. Hence, it 
was God who acted, creating every event constantly and directly without 
any intermediary agents (see Wolfson, 1976, p. 518). Created things had no 
causal power at all. It is only God and God alone, by his own command and 
power that is the direct cause of all events in the world.
It would be interesting to consider briefly the other side of the Islamic 
philosophical-theological discussion on divine action in nature: those whom 
Kalam theologians called the ‘philosophers’. Amongst these, the main one 
Aquinas addressed was Averroes, the commentator of Aristotle (at least by 
the time Aquinas was writing these disputed questions). Averroes’ main 
idea on this subject was that nature acted autonomously, which meant a di-
minishing of God’s omnipotence, an assertion going directly against Kalam 
7  Walzer (1970, p. 648) summarised this idea saying that: “Mutakallimun followed a 
methodology taking the truth of Islam as their starting point”.
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theology. In fact, his position begins by rejecting the idea of creatio ex nihilo, 
for the reason that if this were true anything could, he thinks, come from 
anything, and there would be no congruity between effects and causes. For 
Averroes, the doctrine of creation out of nothing contradicted the existence 
of a true natural causality in the universe, and hence, no science would be 
possible (see Baldner & Carroll, 1997, p. 18). Averroes rejects the denial of 
natural causes with several arguments8. First, for example, he says that if 
there were no natural causes, there would be no scientific knowledge and 
thus no wisdom, given that scientific knowledge is (according to his Aristo-
telian heritage) the knowledge of causes. Second, bearing in mind the argu-
ment for the existence of a cause which caused the existence of the universe, 
he replies that, if the existence of worldly causes is denied, it is impossible to 
prove the existence of the cause which caused the existence of the universe, 
given that it would be impossible to know the fact of causality at all. This 
argument assumes that the invisible is made visible to the intelligence in 
accordance with the visible of the world. However, if there is no causality 
in the world, then there is no possible way to reach the invisible agent, God, 
which works in every instant.
Aquinas summarises these arguments explaining that for these theolo-
gians, of whom he heard through Maimonides, natural forms are accidents, 
and given that accidents cannot pass into another thing, it is impossible for 
a natural thing to introduce a new form into another thing, i.e. to act, con-
cluding that God created forms at each time. In arguing against Kalam theo-
logians, Aquinas holds that their error is due to an incorrect understanding 
of the difference between primary and secondary causality. To show their 
misguidance, Aquinas makes use of three arguments. He affirms that to hold 
that it is only God who acts in nature goes against the senses, reason, and the 
goodness of God (see te Velde, 1995, p. 162). First, it goes against the nature 
of sensation because the senses do not perceive unless the sensible object acts 
upon them. If that object would not act, but were God to act, then it would 
follow that a man does not feel the fire’s heat, if the action of the fire does not 
produce in the sensorial organ a likeness of the heat that is in the fire. In fact, if 
this heat-species would be produced in the organ by another agent, although 
the touch would sense the heat, it would not sense the heat of the fire, nor 
8  For a full list of these arguments see (Wolfson, 1976, pp. 553ss). For a whole 
account of the complete debate between the Kalam theologians and Averroes see 
(Davidson, 1987).
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would it perceive that the fire is hot, and yet the sense judges this to be the 
case. Second, it goes against reason because things and their powers would 
seem to be purposeless; thus, if a knife does not actually cut, but it is God 
doing the cutting, its sharpness would be useless and pointless. Third, this 
position is opposed to God’s goodness which is self-communicative, i.e., the 
very power to act, communicated to creatures, is a indication of God’s good-
ness. Thus, in creation God does not communicate only existence to things 
but also the power to act, making things to His likeness. Finally, Aquinas 
explains that natural forms are not to be considered accidental, since if this 
was the case, there would be no things at all, simply because from substantial 
forms things obtain their substantiality. And even if forms were accidental, 
the powers of the accident in a natural thing can produce the same accident 
into another thing, though not numerically the same9.
b. Against Avicebron
The second kind of argument that Aquinas finds wrong about God’s 
activity in the created order comes from Avicebron, an eleventh century 
9  In S.Th. I, q. 105, a. 5, Aquinas gives two further reasons for rejecting this position: 1) 
it would deprive creation of its order in causes and effects, which, in the end, would go 
against God’s power. God would not be able to create something that would act with 
its own power, but would need to create something that would not act. In the end, 
given that from natural things reason reaches the existence of God and His attributes, 
and that these natural things would not have any power, it would not be possible to 
admit that God has any power at all. In fact, the perfection of effect indicates the perfec-
tion of its cause. Now God is the most perfect agent. Therefore, things created by Him 
receive perfection from Him. Consequently, to detract from the creature’s perfection 
is to detract from the perfection of the divine power. Thus, if no creature exercises an 
action for the production of an effect, much is detracted from the perfection of the 
creature; because it is due to the abundance of its perfection that a thing is able to 
communicate to another the perfection that it has. Hence, to affirm that natural things 
do not operate and it is only God acting diminishes the divine power. 2) If creatures 
would not have any power, their own existence would be meaningless, since creatures 
are perfected by acting. Since they would not act, they would not be perfected. Besides, 
if the effects were produced not by the act of creatures but only by the act of God, the 
power of a created cause cannot possibly be indicated by its effect: since the effect is no 
indication of the cause’s power, except by reason of the action which proceeds from 
the power and terminates in the effect. Now the nature of a cause is not known from 
its effect except in so far as this is an indication of its power that results from its nature. 
Consequently, if creatures exercise no action in producing effects, it will follow that the 
nature of a creature can never be known from its effect: not only creatures would be 
meaningless, but also all knowledge of physical science would be vain.
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Jewish Neo-Platonist philosopher from the Iberian Peninsula, known for his 
doctrine on universal hylo-morphism described in his Fons Vitae. Aquinas 
engages with this doctrine in many a place. In the article I am considering, 
however, he deals with a secondary doctrine, that of the passivity of any 
body, which leads to the affirmation of their inactivity and the subsequent 
affirmation of the ubiquitous divine action (see Fons Vitae II, 10).
Analysing Avicebron’s arguments have the complication that contem-
porary scholarship shows that Aquinas was perhaps a bit too severe arguing 
against him on this particular matter (see Brunner, 1965, p. 81). Still, since 
the main goal of this paper is not to argue for or against Aquinas’ position in 
his QD De Potentia, but to compare his positions, I will simply present Aqui-
nas’ understanding of Avicebron and his argument against him.
Aquinas affirms that for Avicebron no material substance acts, but that 
it is a spiritual force that penetrates through all material substances that acts 
in them. The argument adds that the purer and subtler the substance, the 
more it becomes penetrable by a spiritual force, and so the more active it ap-
pears. There are three arguments that Aquinas recognises in Avicebron for 
holding this position10. First, since every agent, apart from the first creative 
agent, requires a subject that is inferior to it, and since there is no substance 
inferior to the body, the body is not active at all. Second, since every form in 
the body is added to quantity, but quantity prevents action and movement 
–the cause being that the increase of the quantity of a body causes the in-
crease of the weight of the body and the slowing down of its movement– so 
the body is not active, but passive only. Third, since the bodily substance is 
furthest away from the first agent, so active virtue does not reach the bodily 
substance. Just as God is the only agent, the bodily substance, which is the 
lowest in the genus of beings, is passive only. So, it follows according to 
Avicebron that the bodily substance is not active, but that the virtue of the 
spiritual substance, passing through the bodies, causes their actions.
Against these arguments Aquinas offers three counter-arguments (see 
Brunner, 1965, pp. 78-84). He begins explaining that Avicebron is wrong in 
considering the bodily substance as numerically one and the same, differing 
only accidentally and not substantially. Had he seen that bodies were mul-
tiple, he would have noticed that one is superior to the other and closer to 
the first agent, and so there would be bodies which are not the least, i.e. the 
10  Aquinas also deals with this matter in SCG III, 69, and S.Th., I, q. 115, q. 1, corp. 
and ad 2.
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furthest from the first agent, and so one could act on the other. In addition 
to this, Aquinas suggests that even at the lower extremity of beings, bodies 
do not fail to act, since they are still compounding of matter and form, and 
from their form they act. Aquinas also argues that quantity increases activ-
ity rather than diminishes it, giving the sensory experience example of a 
heavy body falling downwards: the greater a heavy material substance is, 
the swifter its downward motion. Finally, adding to this argument, Aquinas 
suggests that Avicebron confuses the relative limitation imposed on the ac-
tion of form by quantity, with the pure and simple suppression of this ac-
tion. He does not perceive that if individualising matter limits the form, the 
latter does not, however, lose the nature its power of action absolutely.
Aquinas concludes his engagement with these two opinions affirming 
that one must hold that God is active in every natural action, not as sup-
pressing the action of the created thing, opening the path to showing how 
he understands this divine action in nature.
c. How God is Active in the Actions of Nature
After rejecting the positions of the Kalam theologians and of Avicebron, 
Aquinas explains his own understanding of God’s operation in nature. 
Aquinas teaches in this second section of the corpus, that to be the cause 
of the action of something else can be understood in four different ways11. 
First, it can be understood as giving it the power to act: every operation 
consequent to a certain power is ascribed to the giver of that power as effect 
to cause. All power of any agent whatsoever is from God. In this way, God 
causes all the actions of nature, because He gives natural things the powers 
by which they are able to act, as from the first principle of all perfection. Sec-
ond, God may be said to be the cause of an action by upholding the natural 
power in its being. Every action that cannot continue after the influence of 
a certain agent has ceased, is from that agent: the preserver of a power is 
said to cause the action; as a remedy that preserves the sight is said to make 
a man see. God not only gave existence to things when they first begin to 
11  These ways are also explained in (te Velde, 1995, pp. 165-166). For Fabro (1961, p. 
399), the development of these four ways in which God causes within the natural 
world “doit montrer progressivement la compénétration de la causalité divine dans la 
causalité créée jusqu’à l’interiorité totale dans l’action de la créature tant par rapport à 
la cause que par rapport à l’effet dans son propre devenir et sa réalisation”. Aquinas 
also offers a similar treatment in his SCG III, c. 67.
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exist, but also causes existence in them as long as they exist, by preserv-
ing them in existence, as we have shown before. So, God is always causing 
as well those powers in them, together with their existence. Consequently, 
if the divine causality were to cease, all operation would come to an end. 
Therefore, every operation of a thing is reducible to God as its cause. I have 
called these two ways of giving the power to act and preserving that power 
the founding moments of God acting in and through natural agents, and the 
next two ways as the dynamic ways of God acting in and through natural 
agents (see Silva, 2014).
The third way is the following: a thing is said to cause another’s action 
by moving it to act: here we do not mean that it causes or preserves the 
active power, but that it applies the power to action, as a man causes the 
knife’s cutting by the very fact that he applies the sharpness of the knife to 
cutting by moving it to cut. And since the lower nature in acting does not act 
except through being moved, God causes the action of every natural thing 
by moving and applying its power to action. Finally, one thing causes the 
action of another, as a principal agent causes the action of its instrument that 
in a way participates in the causal power of the principal agent: and in this 
way God causes every action of natural things. Now in every natural thing 
we find that it is a being, and everything which acts in a certain way cause 
being. Being, however, is the most common first effect and more intimate 
than all other effects, wherefore it is an effect that belongs to God alone to 
produce by His own power. Therefore, in every action of natural beings, 
since they cause being somehow, God is the cause of that action; inasmuch 
as every agent is an instrument of the divine power causing being.
These last two ways of causing the action of another appear to be quite 
similar. If we recall the account Aquinas gives of instrumental causes, how-
ever, we will find the difference. An instrument, when acting as an instru-
ment, has two different actions: one which pertains to it according to its 
own form; another which pertains to it insofar as it is moved by the primary 
agent and that transcends its own form. The first of these two ways of caus-
ing refers to the first action of an instrumental cause. Thus, every agent per-
forms its action according to its own nature and powers, moved and applied 
by God. In the same manner, the second way of causing the action of the 
instrument refers to the causing of being, which is the effect that completely 
transcends the power of the natural being, though it is given to it as a par-
ticipation in God’s power (see te Velde, 1995, p. 173). We need here to bear 
in mind that no finite agent can be understood to produce a particular effect 
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into being. Thus, Thomas adds that this can happen only if it is made to do 
so by the immanence of a universal power which accounts for being as such 
(see te Velde, 1995, p. 170): the primary cause of being. If, then, the agent 
in itself is considered, it is immediate to its effect. The cause of an action, 
however, is the thing by whose power it is done, more even than that which 
does it: even as the principal agent, in comparison with the instrument, is 
more the cause. Thus, if we consider the power whereby the action is done, 
then the power of the higher cause is more immediate to the effect than the 
power of the lower cause; since the power of the lower cause is not coupled 
with its effect save by the power of the higher cause. Therefore, God is more 
the cause of every action than secondary active causes. Thus, in the effect of 
natural causes, being is said to be the result of God’s action in so far as when 
every secondary cause gives being (i.e. specifies the mode of being) it does 
so acting by the power of the first creating cause: this is because being is the 
first effect and presupposes nothing else (see De Pot., q. 3, a. 7, ad 19).
Aquinas concludes that God works in everything inasmuch as every-
thing needs His power in order to acting12. Therefore, God is the cause of 
12  In S.Th. I, q. 105, a. 5, Aquinas concludes similarly, though with a different perspec-
tive in the argumentation. He brings up his notion of the four natural causes, saying 
that of the four causes, matter is the only one that is not a principle of action, but only 
of passion or receiving an action. Hence God cannot act through this kind of causality. 
The other three, however, are principles of action, and indeed with a certain order: the 
final cause makes the agent to move and to produce the form. Accordingly, God acts 
in every single natural action in terms of these three sources of action. God acts as the 
end of every natural action, as the efficient cause, and formal cause, although not as an 
inherent formal cause, but as an exemplar formal cause (In assigning a kind of causal-
ity to God, Aquinas usually affirms that God is causa formalis exemplaris. The formal 
cause can be referred to things in a twofold manner: first, as the intrinsic formal cause. 
Second, a formal cause can be referred to as extrinsic to the thing, as that according to 
which things are made, and thus this is also called a formal cause. See In V Met., l. 2, n. 
2.). Aquinas argues that God causes as the final cause of every action of natural agents. 
According to what has been said, every action pursues a good (real or apparent). Noth-
ing can be called a good except due to its likeness to the supreme goodness, which is 
God. This likeness is caused by the supreme good, and thus God causes as the end 
of the actions of every natural agent. Secondly, as in a sequence of many agents, the 
second agent depends on the action of the first agent, natural agents depend on God’s 
action to be caused to act. Hence God is the cause of every action of natural agents, as 
causing their forms to act in the way in which a craftsman applies his axe to cutting 
the wood. Finally, God also gives things their forms and keeps them in existence. And 
since the form of anything is within it and God is properly intimate to things, given 
that he is the giver of being and existence, Thomas concludes that God acts intimately 
in all things by giving them their forms and preserving them in existence.
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everything’s action inasmuch as He gives everything the power to act, and 
preserves that power in being and applies it to action, and inasmuch as by 
His power every other power acts. And because God is His own power, 
and He is in all things as upholding them in their being, Aquinas adds that 
God acts in every agent immediately.
Nevertheless, these notions should be understood in the sense that the 
active and passive powers of a natural thing suffice for action in their own 
order, yet require the divine power (see De Pot., q. 3, a. 7, ad 1), since God 
and the natural agents act on two different levels. The same effect is as-
cribed to a natural cause and to God, not as though a part of the effect were 
performed by God and a part by the natural agent: the whole effect pro-
ceeds from each, yet in different ways: just as the whole of the one same 
effect is ascribed to the instrument, and again the whole is ascribed to the 
principal agent. It is in this respect, in the acting together of the two orders 
of primary and secondary causes, that Aquinas argues that the powers 
of nature do not suffice to produce their effects. That which is made by 
God in natural things, which makes them to operate, is a mere capacity or 
inclination to act, and as such is a kind of incomplete being (see De Pot., q. 
3, a. 7, ad 7)13. Thus, natural things are given their powers to act as a form 
within them, though not the power to cause: as art can give the axe its 
sharpness as a permanent form, but not the power of the art as a perma-
nent form. Therefore, it is necessary for them to receive that power from 
the first cause, which is God, to cause actually (see De Pot., q. 3, a. 7, ad 7), 
in the same way the axe, although it has the form to do it, could not chop a 
piece of wood unless it is moved by the craftsman. The craftsman gives the 
axe the power with which the axe actually chops the wood according to its 
form. In a similar manner, God gives natural things the power to perform 
their operations according to their own forms.
These statements would seem to imply, again, that it is not necessary 
to admit that nature works, because if a sufficient cause is acting then there 
is no longer the necessity of another cause, and God acts as a sufficient 
cause. Nevertheless, Thomas argues that God acts perfectly as first cause, 
but that the operation of nature as secondary cause is, in a sense, also nec-
essary, because, even though God can produce the natural effect without 
nature, He wishes to act by means of nature in order to preserve the order 
of things (see De Pot., q. 3, a. 7, ad 16). It is not that God does not have the 
13  See (te Velde, 1995, pp. 173-175).
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sufficient power to cause what He causes through natural causes14. Were 
He willing to do so, He could. God, however, acts through natural causes 
because of the immensity of His goodness, by which He decides to com-
municate His similitude to things, not only in their existence, but also in 
their being causes of other things15.
After having presented Aquinas’ arguments against those who do hold 
that nature does not act and that it is only God’s action what we perceive 
in nature, and his arguments for God’s operation within the operations of 
nature in his QD De Potentia Dei 3, 7, I shall now analyse his position in the 
Liber de Causis.
3. The Influence of the First Cause in Aquinas’ Expositio in Liber de Causis
The Liber de Causis was often considered to be a work of Aristotle’s for 
much of the thirteenth century, and one might rightfully assume that Aqui-
nas was of the same idea, as many of his references to the philosophus in his 
early works evidence. For example, in I Super Sent. d. 8 q. 1 a. 2 s.c. 1 (1252-
56): “Deus non unitur rebus, quod patetetiam per philosophum Lib. de causis”; in 
Super De Trinitate, pars 3 q. 6 a. 1 arg. 22 (1252/58): “et philosophus in libro 
de causis”; in De Veritate, q. 21 a. 5 co. (1256-59): “hanc videtur esse inten-
tion philosophi in Lib. de causis”; in Quodlibet IX, q. 3 co. (1258): “secundum 
philosophum in libro de causis” and in De Potentia Dei, q. 7 a. 2 arg. 6 (1266): 
“contra philosophum dicentem in Lib. de causis”. One might follow Guagliardo 
and Vansteenkiste, who argue that the use of the term ‘philosophus’ has not 
been categorically shown to refer to Aristotle in the works of Aquinas, and 
that the use of this term to name the author of the Liber should be read as an 
ambiguous term used due to his doubts about the authorship of the book 
(see Guagliardo, 1996, p. x). Still, this is a rather historically audacious hy-
pothesis to hold, and I prefer to stick with tradition on this point.
Either way, it was only by May 1268, two years after his QD De Pon-
tentia Dei, when William of Moerbeke finished his translation into Latin of 
Proclus’ Elementa Theologica, that medieval scholars realise that the Liber was 
14  Fabro (1961, p. 490), explains that “Dieu pourrait faire tout par lui-même, saint 
Thomas l’admet, mais c’est un signe de puissance supérieure d’appeler d’autres à par-
ticiper à sa propre puissance.”
15  See te Velde (1995, p. 175): “God does not want to produce the effects of nature with-
out nature, but that he causes nature to operate and to make its own effect by mediat-
ing the natural power of each thing with the being of that effect.”
67Studium. Filosofía y Teología. Vol. XXII, 43 (2019) 53-72
Ignacio Silva
actually a collection of Proclus’ propositions from that book. It was Aquinas 
who first acknowledged the authorship of the Liber to an Arab scholar who 
brought together a set of propositions included in Proclus’ Elementa, as he 
explicitly affirms in the prooemium of his exposition in 1272: “it seems that 
one of the Arab philosophers excerpted it from this book by Proclus, espe-
cially since everything in it is contained much more fully and ore diffusely in 
that of Proclus”. Many scholars seemed to have continued holding the view 
that the Liber was Aristotle’s own work (pace Guagliardo and Vansteenkiste) 
even after Aquinas’ commentary. For example, in the very continuation of 
Aquinas’ commentary to Aristotle’s Politics, written by Petrus de Alvernia 
(see Hocedez, 1933, p. 23), his fidelissimus discipulus (see Hocedez, 1933, p. 9), 
after Aquinas’ death in 1274 (see Perotto, 1966, p. 27), we read: unde philoso-
phus dicit in libro de causis (In Politic. continuatio, lib. 7, l. 12, n. 13)16, following 
Aquinas’ use before his own commentary to the Liber.
I will present some of the main points in Aquinas’ commentary to the 
text of the Liber, in particular those referring to the relation between pri-
mary and secondary causes, as to offer some keys to understand how his 
doctrines on providence and the activity of God in the operations of nature 
are a good example of how he combined Aristotelian thought with Neo-
Platonism throughout his scholarly work.
Each lectio of Aquinas’ Expositio comments on each of the 32 propositions 
of the Liber, including discussions, on the First Cause, Intelligences, and the 
Soul, and their relations to the governance of the natural world. For Aquinas, 
the first proposition of the Liber guides the development of the full doctrine 
on primary and secondary causes: “Every primary cause infuses its effect 
more powerfully than does a universal second cause,” which he subdivides 
into three points: “(1) that the first cause infuses the effect more powerfully 
than does the second cause; (2) that the impression of the first cause recedes 
later from the effect; (3) that it reaches the effect first.” Following the Liber, 
Aquinas affirms in his lectio 1 that the primary cause has priority over sec-
ondary causes because its power extends to more things and so “its proper 
effect must be more common”. In particular, Aquinas teaches that the power 
of the primary cause extends to the causality of secondary causes: “For the 
first cause itself produces and moves the cause acting secondarily and so be-
comes the cause of its acting” (all from In Liber de Causis, I).
16  It remains an open question whether Petrus read Aquinas’ commentary to the Liber.
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He then describes the relation of these two kinds of causes, saying: “the 
activity by which the second cause causes an effect is caused by the first 
cause, for the first cause aids the second cause, making it to act. Therefore, the 
first cause is more a cause than the second cause of that activity in virtue 
of which an effect is produced by the second cause” (In Liber de Causis, I. 
My emphasis). Here Aquinas recurs to Proclus’ explanation of this doctri-
ne, explaining that the Neo-Platonic author suggests that since a “second 
cause has its own substance from the first cause”, it also has its power from 
that very first cause. Then, given that this power produces the effect, the se-
cond cause is the cause of its effect due to the first cause, which is, therefore, 
“more the cause of the effect than the second cause” (In Liber de Causis, I ).
It is by lectio 9, where Aquinas is particularly concerned with how an 
intelligence receives its power to know from the first cause, that he explains 
this doctrine. Aquinas does not doubt in using clear Neo-Platonic termi-
nology, affirming that the creature participates in God’s causality: “of the 
perfections coming to things from the first cause, there is something that 
reaches all things, even down to generable and corruptible things, namely, 
being. But there is something that does not reach effects insofar as they are 
effects but only causes insofar as they are causes, namely power. Hence the 
participation of power [participatio virtutis] reaches as far as nature, which 
has the character of a principle”. Further into the lectio’s text he explains that 
“intelligence, soul, and nature have power participated from another, as the 
power of a second cause is participated from the power of the first cause, 
which is not participated from another, but is itself the cause of power” (In 
Liber de Causis, 9. My emphasis).
Aquinas continues his in-depth explanation on the relation between 
primary and secondary causes in lectio 23 (devoted to how intelligences 
know and rule lower beings), acknowledging that the action of the secon-
dary created cause is a product of this participation: “whatever abundantly 
participates a characteristic proper to some thing becomes like it not only in 
form but also in action... Because form is the principle of action, everything 
that acquires its action from an abundant participation of the infusion of a 
higher agent [ex abundanti participatione influxus superioris agentis] must have 
two actions: one according to its proper form, another according to a form 
participated from the higher agent, as a heated knife cuts according to its 
proper form but burns insofar as it is heated”. Participation in being and 
in action is, thus, the ultimate root of the action of an instrumental cause, 
and hence of every created cause. From these ideas Aquinas arrives to the 
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fact that God’s providence extends to all things, since “what is essentially 
act and goodness, namely God, essentially and originally communicates his 
goodness to things. This belongs to his rule, for it is proper for a ruler to 
lead those that are ruled to their appropriate end, which is the good… And 
so, the rule of the first cause, which is according to the essence of goodness, 
extends to all things” (both quotations from In Liber de Causis, 23).
4. Concluding Analysis
Aquinas worked on the Liber since the beginning of his academic career, 
and so adopted many of its Neo-Platonic tones and doctrines, even if think-
ing they were Aristotelian, some of which include: “that the first being, God, 
is the ‘cause of causes’; that being (esse) as the ‘first of created things’ is the 
most proper effect of God, and, in St. Thomas’ metaphysics, is the perfection 
by which all other perfections are in the creature’s real participation in what 
God essentially is; that God as the first cause is ‘innermostly mostly’ present 
in all things by His abiding power as cause…; that second causes, while real 
causes, do not act without the first cause, and whatever power they have is 
due to the power of the first cause; that God rules all things without being 
mixed with them” (Guagliardo, 1996, p. xxx).
In his QD Potentia Dei Aquinas explicitly quotes the Liber de Causis thirty 
times, twice of which appear in the article I analyse in this paper (Guagliar-
do, 1996, 172). In his Expositio, even if he does not make explicit reference to 
the De Potentia (he tends not to reference explicitly other works of his own), 
he does treat the issue of the relation between primary and secondary causes 
with great similarity to his treatment in the disputed questions.
The q. 3 a. 7 of De Potentia is a question about the works of God in 
nature, so it is the place where Aquinas, in this work, expands at length in 
his treatment of the relationship between primary and secondary causes, 
distinguishing the four different ways in which they relate, and that I have 
grouped in two sets: the founding moments and the dynamic moments. In 
his Exposition super Librum de Causis, on the contrary, being a commentary of 
the text, Aquinas follows the themes that appear in each of the propositions, 
adding those that he considers pertinent to clarify or expand the author’s 
ideas. So, even if he offers a lengthy treatment of the relationship between 
primary and secondary causes, he does not do it all in one section. Still, it 
is noteworthy to remark that he does recur to the same distinctions in both 
works, recurring both to Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic notions and termi-
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nology, emphasising one over the other according to the tone of the question 
and text on which he is commenting.
What I have called the founding moments of divine providence (cre-
ation and sustaining), Aquinas explains in his first two ways in the De Po-
tentia and in lectio 1 of his Expositio with further comments in lectio 9. As the 
earlier text shows, Aquinas is discussing these two ways in a more Aris-
totelian way, even quoting Aristotle’s Physics IV explaining that “[a] pro-
ducer moves heavy and light things, inasmuch as it gives them the power 
by which such movements results”, to show that God gives the power to 
act when creating and sustains that power in being. In the latter text, Aqui-
nas explains this very doctrine intertwining the Aristotelian ideas with the 
Neo-Platonic notion of participation, evidencing the intimate relation both 
traditions reach in his mature thought. In lectio 1 he states the first two ways 
in which God is said to act through secondary causes in what could be seen 
as neutral tones, affirming that “the first cause itself produces and moves 
the cause acting secondarily and so becomes the cause of its acting”. Still, by 
lectio 9, he affirms, in certainly Neo-Platonic terms, that “the participation of 
power [participatio virtutis] reaches as far as nature, which has the character 
of a principle”.
The final two moments present a more direct relationship between the 
two works, since they have, as te Velde remarks (1995, p. 165), a clear Neo-
Platonic character in De Potentia, given that the instrument acts insofar it 
‘participates’ the power of the principal agent. In fact, Aquinas quotes the 
Liber’s propositions 1 and 9 in his De Potentia when explaining the fourth 
way, to express two key ideas of his thought. First to say that all being is 
created by God as the most universal of all effects, and second to affirm 
that, due to this metaphysical fact, God’s causality is more intimate to the 
effects that the causality of secondary causes. Recurring to the metaphysi-
cal tools of instrumental causation and its two kinds of effects to explain 
how the divine cause is present in every action of created causes presents 
Aquinas with the opportunity to confer a dual Aristotelian/Neo-Platonic 
aspect to his doctrine of providence, utilising both thought traditions to de-
velop a full and solid concept of how God is seen to act through secondary 
causes. Thus, in his Expositio of proposition 23, he delves deeply into the 
Neo-Platonic language to speak about these dynamic ways of God acting 
in the actions of created beings: “everything that acquires its action from an 
abundant participation of the infusion of a higher agent must have two ac-
tions: one according to its proper form, another according to a form partici-
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pated from the higher agent”, which is the Neo-Platonic explanation of the 
two dynamic ways. In his De Potentia, also, when explaining these two ways, 
Aquinas recurs to the notion of participation to explain these ideas, saying 
that the instrument “somewhat causes that effect inasmuch as it participates 
in the power of the first cause”, adding in an Aristotelian fashion that this 
participation is done “by being moved by the first cause”.
Many other parallels could be found between these two texts, the QD 
De Poentia q. 3, a 7, and the Expositio super Librum de Causis. Still, I believe 
these few are enough to show not only that Aquinas adopts this fourfold 
characterization of God’s acting in a through secondary causes to explain his 
doctrine of providence in his mature thought, but also that he does so recur-
ring to Aristotelian as well as Neo-Platonic metaphysical principles avail-
able to him via the philosopher’s and Proclus’ texts. As Norris Clarke puts 
it, after all, Aquinas’ Neo-platonically inspired participation metaphysics is 
“a personal synthesis which he constructed by (1) taking over the general 
formal structure of Neoplatonic participation theory, (2) emptying it of its 
excessive Platonic realism of ideas, (3) filling it with the new wine of his own 
quite original insight into the act of existence as the ultimate positive core of 
all real perfections – an act which is multiplied and diversified by reception 
into various limiting modes of essence, and (4) expressing the whole struc-
ture in a transformed Aristotelian terminology of act and potency” (Clarke, 
2007, p. 48)17.
References
Altaie, B. (2008). The Understanding of Creation in Islamic Thought: a Re-
sponse to Keith Ward. En Neil Spurway (ed.), Creation and the Abrahamic 
Faiths (pp. 13-22). Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Alusi, H. M. al-Din (1965). The problem of creation in Islamic thought, Qur’an, 
Hadîth, Commentaries, and Kalâm. Cambridge: CUP.
Baldner, S. E. & Carroll, William E. (transl.) (1997). Aquinas on Creation. To-
ronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
Brock, S. L. (2007). Thomas Aquinas and the De hebdomanibus. Nova et Vetera 
5(3), 465-493.
Brunner, F. (1965). Platonisme et aristotélisme: la critique d’Ibn Gabirol par Saint 
Thomas d’Aquin. Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain.
17  See also (Brock, 2007, p. 475).
72 Studium. Filosofía y Teología. Vol. XXII, 43 (2019) 53-72
Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Divine Providence
Clarke, W. N. (2007). The Philosophical Approach to God. NY: Fordham Uni-
versity Press.
Davidson, H. (1987). Proofs for eternity, creation and the existence of God in me-
dieval Islamic and Jewish philosophy. Oxford: OUP.
Fabro, C. (1961). Participation et Causalité selon S. Thomas D’Aquin. Louvain: 
Publications Universitaires de Louvain.
Frank, R. (2007a). Remarks on the early development of the Kalam. En 
Gutas, Dimitri (ed.), Philosophy, theology and mysticism in medieval Islam 
(pp. 315-329). Aldershot: Ashgate.
Frank, R. (2007b). The Structure of Created Causality according to al-
Ash’ari’. En Gutas, Dimitri (ed.), Early Islamic theology: the Mu’tazilites 
and al-Ash’ari (pp. 13-75). Aldershot: Ashgate.
Guagliardo, V. (1996). Introduction. En St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary 
on the Book of Causes (ix-xxxii). Washington: The Catholic University of 
America Press.
Hocedez, E. (1933). La vie et les œuvres de Pierre D’Auvergne. Gregorianum 
14(1), 3-36.
Perotto, L. (1966). ‘Introduzione’. En S. Tommaso d’Aquino, Commento alla 
Politica di Aristotele (7-32). Bologna: Edizioni Studio Domenicano.
Silva, I. (2014). Revisiting Aquinas on Providence and Rising to the Chal-
lenge of Divine Action in Nature. The Journal of Religion 94(3), 277-291.
te Velde, R. (1995). Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas. Leiden: 
Brill.
Walzer, R. (2007). ‘Early Islamic Philosophers’, in A. H. Armstrong (ed.), The 
Cambridge History of Late Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy (pp. 641-
669). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wolfson, H. (1976). The Philosophy of the Kalam. Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Recepción: 02.10.18
Aceptación: 06.02.19
